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Property-Servitudes & Building Restrictions
Lee Hargrave*
RoAD & STREET SERVITUDES
Last year's Developments' described the broad authority of local
governments to terminate public use of roads and streets by formal
action. Two court of appeal decisions in the current term demonstrate
the difficulties involved in terminating the public's interest in roads and
streets without such formal action by local government authorities.
In both Winn v. Jefferson Davis Parish Police Jury2 and IP Tim-
berlands Operating Co. v. DeSoto Parish Police Jury,3 the courts found
that servitudes in favor of the public on seldom-used rural dirt roads
had not been lost by prescription of non-use or by abandonment. In
Winn, a landowner requested a declaration that a road running from
a parish road along a boundary line, half the road on each property,
to the plaintiff's home and to a neighbor's property, was no longer
available for public use. In IP Timberlands, a hunting club with a lease
on forest lands sought to prevent the public use of a one-lane dirt road
that ran from a state highway to a small bayou.
In the formal revocation procedure, as provided by Louisiana Revised
Statutes 48:701 and similar statutes, an ordinance or other legislative
act of the governing authority ends the public's interest if the road is
no longer needed. This procedure is the simplest means of returning to
private interests lands that had been dedicated to public use. Under
Louisiana Revised Statutes 48:701, the land that had been owned by
the government entity is usually transferred to the contiguous landowners.
Though it is not clearly stated in section 701, the courts have also
allowed local governments to revoke the dedication of servitudes. 4 If
the public's interest is a servitude, the revocation terminates it, allowing
the landowner to return to full enjoyment of the property without the
limitations of that real right.
Copyright 1990, by LOUISINA LAW RE iEW.
* Wex S. Malone Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Hargrave, Developments in the Law, Property, 50 La. L. Rev. 353 (1989).
2. 560 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
3. 552 So. 2d 605 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
4. Hargrave, supra note 1, at 358.
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When no formal revocation is present, the governing principles have
been borrowed from the laws applicable to predial servitudes., No specific
legislation covers termination of public streets other than section 701,6
and the Louisiana Civil Code articles providing for termination by ten
years non-use 7 and by renunciation or abandonment' are apparently
applied by analogy. It is arguable that a more rational solution would
be to adopt specific statutes for terminating such servitudes in favor of
the public. Such public servitudes involve different policy concerns than
those that come into play when dealing with servitudes that benefit only
other estates.
Servitudes in favor of the public, for example, are usually more
burdensome on the landowner. More people will have a right to use
the passage, people who may not be known to the landowner. Addi-
tionally, in predial servitudes of passage between estates, for example,
the Louisiana Civil Code makes clear that not all uses preserve the
servitude; only uses "as appertaining to the dominant estate." 9 That
rule would provide for continuation of the servitude if the passage were
used by current owners or their visitors; use by the general public for
general transportation from point to point would not. On the other
hand, if the servitude is in favor of the public, it would appear that
any use by any member of the public for any reason would be sufficient.
In such a case, the encumbrance that the servitude places on the land
is much more difficult to terminate.
Indeed, it is problematic even to speak of a servitude of passage
in favor of the general public. The code does not provide specifically
for such servitudes in favor of the public.10 Not until the 1977 Louisiana
Civil Code revision were such limited personal servitudes in favor of a
5. La. Civ. Code art. 646, "A predial servitude is a charge on a servient estate for
the benefit of a dominant estate."
6. La. R.S. 48:711-719 (1984 and Supp. 1990), La. Const. art. VI, §§ 5(E), 9 (home
rule charter provisions).
7. La. Civ. Code art. 753, "A predial servitude is extinguished by non-use for ten
years."
8. La. Civ. Code art. 771, "A predial servitude is extinguished by an express and
written renunciation by the owner of the dominate estate." Prior to 1977, the corresponding
Civil Code provisions, Articles 816 and 817, provided that the renunciation could be tacit,
with Article 819 adding, "The release of the servitude is tacit, when the owner of the
estate to which it is due permits the owner of the estate charged with the servitude, to
build on it such works as presuppose the annihilation of the right, because they prevent
the exercise of it .. "
9. La. Civ. Code art. 757.
10. 1904 La. Acts No. 25 amended La. Civ. Code art. 765 to allow acquisitive
prescription of servitudes of this type, using the language: "The public, represented by
the various parishes'in this state, may also in like manner acquire a servitude ..
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person, as distinguished from an estate, clearly authorized. For some
time, however, court decisions and general acceptance had resulted in
these public road and street interests being treated as servitudes in favor
of the public. ,2 Moreover, the Louisiana Civil Code itself makes similar
analogies for its natural servitudes (Articles 655-658) and legal servitudes
(Articles 659-696). They are in favor of persons or the public generally
and not in favor of an estate. However, the drafters did not borrow
the provisions on prescription of non-use of such servitudes. Article 758
provides that prescription does not run as to natural servitudes and
Article 696 provides that an enclosed estate's right of passage may not
be lost by prescription.
This whole area is ripe for legislative action to accommodate with
more precision the means for losing public rights by non-use, as opposed
to loss of private rights.
Prescription of Non-Use
The court in Winn continued a strict application of the non-use
requirements, "which simply means that a full ten years must pass
without any use of the road before the servitude is lost."' 3 The court
found evidence of use by the public "on numerous occasions" and
stated that the fact that the landowner may have often "run off" persons
on the road without permission was irrelevant.
In IP Timberlands, the dirt road had become public by three-year
maintenance by the police jury.' 4 In such a case, a former Orivate road
becomes public and the public acquires a servitude. In no statute,
however, is it stated that lack of maintenance results in the road reverting
to a private road. The court therefore concluded that even though the
police jury had not maintained the road for almost twenty years, the
public's interest was not extinguished on that account. Further it found
that "the public, in the form of hunters, trappers, fisherman, nature
lovers and adjacent landowners, continued their regular use of the road."' 5
In applying these rules of prescription, the two cases were decided
on traditional grounds. They do illustrate, however, the difficulties in
* restoring property to the private domain when the public's use is not
11. A. Yiannopoulos, Personal Servitudes § 223, in 3 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(3d ed. 1989).
12. E.g., Comment, Dedication of Land to Public Use, 16 La. L. Rev. 789 (1956).
13. Winn v. Jefferson Davis Parish Police Jury, 560 So. 2d 89, 91 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1990).
14. La. R.S. 48:491(B) (1984 and Supp. 1990), "All roads and streets in this state
which have been or hereafter are kept up, maintained, or worked for a period of three
years by authority of a parish governing authority ... shall be public roads and streets."
15. IP Timberlands Operating Co. v. DeSoto Parish Police Jury, 552 So. 2d 605,
607 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
1990]
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frequent. Even though the burden of proving a use is on the dominant
estate, 6 presumably the member of the public seeking the right to use
the road, the cases suggest that the burden is easily met by the testimony
of one person using the road. The solution for the private landowner
is the political one of obtaining ' formal revocation from the local
governing authority. Self help would be another possibility, through
barricading 7 the road or putting a gate on the road, or otherwise
prohibiting use.' 8
Renunciation or Abandonment
One finds some loose language in opinions about roads "abandoned
through ten years nonuse"' 9 and "abandonment through nonuse." 20
However, true abandonment of a real right, technically called a renun-
ciation in several code articles, 2' refers to an expression of intent to
relinquish one's rights with respect to a thing. No time period is required
to elapse for the renunciation to be effective. On the other hand, if
true prescription of non-use is involved, non-use for ten years is all
that need be proved. Intent is of no concern. It is true that a long
period of non-use by the holder of a right could well support inferences
of an intent to abandon, but such an intent would still be necessary to
have a true renunciation.
Some courts, apparently applying predial servitude principles by
analogy, have suggested that informal abandonment is a means of ter-
minating a public use servitude. One might reject the analogy outright
here, since the adoption of Louisiana Revised Statutes 48:701 is the
more specific provision that directly governs termination by the body
that represents the public. Indeed, in normal predial servitude renun-
ciation cases, the focus would be on the mind of the owner of the
dominant estate. That person's intent must be examined to determine
if he or she desired to give up a right. Of course, that will usually
involve inferences from conduct. With public rights, however, it is
difficult to analyze the mental state or the intent of "the public." It
is almost impossible for one to speak of looking to the minds of all
the general public. Realistically, one would be making inferences from
conduct and then dealing with a hypothetical or fictional intent. In a
more practical approach, the suggestion in the cases is to deal with the
intent or the mind of the governing authority and to ask whether the
16. La. Civ. Code art. 764.
17. Stelly v. Vermillion Parish Police Jury, 482 So. 2d 1052 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
18. Jackson v. Langsport, 322 So. 2d 281 (La. App. 2d. Cir. 1975).
19. Stelly, 482 So. 2d at 1055..
20. Robinson v. Beauregard Parish Police Jury, 351 So. 2d 113, 115 (La. 1977).
21. E.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 626, 737, 771, 1014.
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police jury has abandoned or renounced the servitude. That approach,
however, is an additional reason for rejecting the analogy to predial
servitudes since Louisiana Revised Statutes 48:701 specifically provides
for a means of abandonment by a police jury (as opposed to aban-
donment or renunciation by the general public).
Indeed, the 1977 revision of the Louisiana Civil Code added the
requirement that renunciations of predial servitudes must be express and
written. 22 That was a change from the prior law, which permitted tacit
renunciations. Even then, however, tacit renunciation was not presumed
and there had to be some work of a "permanent and solid kind, such
as an edifice or walls, and that they present an absolute obstacle to
every kind of exercise of the servitude.1 2a
The argument for tacit renunciation appears in dictum in a few
cases, but the support for applying the concept to public servitudes is
weak. In 1946, in Starnes v. Police Jury of Rapides Parish,24 Judge
Hardy of the second circuit suggested that an informal abandonment
was possible, "[b]y the clear and well-established proof of an intent on
the part of the governing body to abandon." In that case, however,
he easily found that such an intent on the part of the corporate police
jury was not present even though one police juror, the member rep-
resenting the area involved, may have had that intent. The result of
the case was to continue the rights of the public to use the road.
Justice Dixon in Robinson v. Beauregard Parish Police Jury2 5 faced
the problem of a parish's tort responsibility for a bridge under the
theory that it was responsible for the condition of this public road. The
defense argued that the road had been abandoned. Justice Dixon found
that no informal abandonment had occurred, though he did rely on
Starnes for the view that informal abandonment was a possibility.
When the second circuit had an opportunity to consider the issue
again in Fore v. Volentine,26 the court once more found no intent to
abandon. Furthermore, in reference to Starnes and Robinson, Judge
Hall wrote:
If these two cases stand for the proposition that the character
of a road as a public road can be changed by abandonment by
the police jury without compliance with statutory requirements
for abandonment, without formal action by the police jury, and
without ten years nonuse, they stand alone in Louisiana juris-
prudence. Although the language of these cases supports the
22. La. Civ. Code art. 771.
23. La. Civ. Code art. 820 (1870).
24. 27 So. 2d 134 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1946).
25. 351 So. 2d 113 (La. 1977).
26. 385 So. 2d 860 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
19901
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concept . . ., the context in which these holdings were made
and the results in the two cases detract from the authority of
the cases for that proposition.27
More recently, the third circuit has seemed to approve of the concept
of informal abandonment. In Stelly v. Vermillion Parish Police Jury,2"
the court held that the road in question had ceased to be public. The
opinion then stated, somewhat cryptically, "[T]here was a clear and
well-established intent by the police jury to abandon the road, and the
public has not used the road for a period in excess of ten years." 2 9 If
there was ten years non-use, the abandonment rationale was unnecessary.
If the court was applying a true abandonment concept, the reference
to ten years non-use was unnecessary. This uncertainty as to the rationale
of Stelly was noted in the later opinion of the third circuit in Winn.
The court, retreating from its position in Stelly, said:
We note that Stelly, supra, and Robinson, . . . suggest that
a public road may be abandoned by a governing body without
formal revocation, relocation, or non-use. However, in Stelly,
the Police Jury's lack of maintenance or 'de facto' abandonment
was combined with both relocation and ten years of non-use.
In Robinson, the actions of the Police Jury were insufficient to
constitute abandonment, especially considering there was no rev-
ocation, relocation, or non-use. We therefore believe Stelly,
Robinson and an earlier Second Circuit case, Starnes ... can
be reconciled with the rules set forth in this opinion. 0
If the third circuit did not overrule its decision in Stelly, it certainly
has limited its application. No case can be cited in which there has
been a holding that an informal abandonment has taken place when
there was no ten year period of non-use.
As suggested earlier, this result may well be the best solution. The
implications of Louisiana Revised Statutes 48:701 are that a formal
revocation is needed for the police jury to terminate a public use, without
room for a court-developed rule of informal abandonment. The latest
expression of the legislative will in a similar area is against informal
revocations of servitudes, even between private persons; there the ren-
unciations must be express.
27. Id. at 862.
28. 482 So. 2d 1052 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 485 So. 2d 65 (1986).
29. Id. at 1056.
30. Winn v. Jefferson Davis Parish Police Jury,. 560 So. 2d 89 (La. App. 3d Cir.





An analysis of the policies in this area does not lead to a clearly
obvious solution. On one hand, there is the general policy in favor of
simplicity of title which forbids permanent division of the rights of
ownership in property and encourages extinction of servitudes and return
to full rights of ownership in one person. Freedom from servitudes
serves the owner's and society's interests by making the property more
developable and more susceptible of commercial transactions.
Title examination certainty and simplicity can also come into play.
Often, public road servitudes will be established by three year mainte-
nance or informal dedication, and thus will not be indicated by doc-
uments in the public records. Encouraging termination of such rights
will foster the reliability of public records in such matters. It is also
true that the public use of servitude is normally more burdensome than
a predial servitude of passage which is in favor of a more limited group.
Thus, the public servitude should be easier to terminate.
On the other hand is the concern with the general public's access
to and use of roads and waterbodies in rural recreational areas, as in
the IP Timberlands case. (In Harris v. Adams," the road was used once
a year by the public during the Grand Isle Tarpon Rodeo.) Not involved,
however, is a landowner's right to access to his property; the enclosed
estate servitude protects that person's rights by providing a passage for
him and for travelers to his property.3 2 Conflicting policies about public
use may also be suggested in Winn, where the road was presumably
used for the disfavored activity of dumping garbage as well as for the
presumably favored activity of a teenagers' lovers lane.
STREETS & BUILDING RESTRICTIONS
The requirements for dedicating subdivision streets and terminating
the public's interest in such streets are provided in detail in Louisiana
Revised Statutes 33:5051 and 48:701. The requirements for establishing
building and use restrictions on lots in subdivisions are stated in Louis-
iana Civil Code articles 775-783. These two legal institutions have gen-
erally been handled as separate regimes, presumably because they each
have their own historical development and have different policy concerns
behind them. The fourth circuit court of appeal in Lake Terrace Property
Owners Association v. City of New Orleans3 mixed the two institutions
31. 203 So. 2d 809 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
32. La. Civ. Code art. 689. See Bulliard v. Delahoussaye, 481 So. 2d 747 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1985) (road formally abandoned; enclosed owner would have the right of access
as an enclosed estate).
33. 556 So. 2d Ill (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990). After this manuscript was completed,




in an odd way. The decision in that case, because of its convoluted
factual setting, is not likely to be important precedent, but it raises
some important issues about the two institutions and reveals some mis-
conceptions about the relationship between the two.
Lake Terrace involves what was described as "12 foot easements"
for use by an electric utility and as "public walks." They apparently
were dedicated to public use by the subdividers and were thus owned
by the city. Under Coliseum Square Ass'n v. City of New Orleans,14 it
would appear that the city could terminate the public use if it was no
longer needed for public use. In such a case, the property could return
to adjacent landowners or could be sold. Aware of this fact, the court
of appeal in Lake Terrace, the same court that was reversed by the
supreme court in Coliseum Square, sought to find another means of
prohibiting the proposed city action. However, the factual setting and
the procedural posture of the case complicated the apparently simple
solution. The plaintiffs had sought to enjoin the city, not from ter-
minating the public use, but from selling the property on which the
crosswalk was located. It was also determined "that all parties to the
action acknowledge that the building restrictions must remain in force,
unless the subdivision property owners vote to remove them, whether
or not the disputed property is sold.""
It thus appears that public use of the crosswalk would be protected
even if the property was sold. Nonetheless, the court enjoined the sale,
citing as its authority a principle that, "[ijf something is public it cannot
be alienated or appropriated for private use." 36 That principle, and the
case the court cited to support it, does apply to the beds of navigable
waterbodies owned by the state, which are, by constitutional provision,
inalienable.3 7 But nothing in the constitution or the Louisiana Civil Code
so provides with respect to streets. Indeed, Louisiana Revised Statutes
48:701 clearly allows municipalities to terminate the dedication of a
street, a public thing, and alienate it. New Orleans' home rule charter
provides similar authority. Further, the Louisiana Civil Code clearly
provides that public things are subject to public use only "in accordance
with applicable laws and regulations," '38 recognizing the overriding public
law aspect of the public's interest in streets. Indeed, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory limitations on converting public things to
private things, the question of the power of cities to do so is more a
matter of local government law than basic property classification law.
34. 544 So. 2d 351 (La. 1989).
35. 556 So. 2d at 116.
36. Id. (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d 576 (La. 1974)).
37. La. Const. art. IX, § 3.
38. La. Civ. Code art. 452.
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And in that area, statutes and home rule charters allow termination of
the public's use of streets and roads. It would thus appear that the
court is without authority in stating that the city cannot transfer own-
ership of a public walk to private owners simply because it is a public
thing. In any event, given the posture of this case, even if the property
were transferred to private owners, the public interest would remain
protected since there would be allowable public use. This would be
consistent with Louisiana Civil Code article 455 which indicates that
private things may be subject to public use in accordance with law or
by dedication.
The foregoing analysis would.be the straightforward approach based
on the law that developed with respect to dedicated streets, alleys and
walkways. And since it goes off on 'another point, the. court of appeal
apparently recognizes the force of that analysis.
The innovation in the opinion is the court's analysis of the effect
of the subdivision building restrictions on the public walkways. In the
document containing building restrictions for the subdivision, there also
appeared Section IX which stated that "12 foot easements" would be
provided and there would be "public walks" and that these easements
"are public property and will be dedicated to the City of New Orleans."
The court concluded that the property was acquired by the city subject
to the building restriction that this'property be a public walk. The court
then suggests that the only way to change this requirement would be
by approval of the subdivision owners of a change in the restriction.39
If taken to its logical conclusion, any revocation of a dedication of a
street contained in a document entitled "Building Restrictions" could
not be effective without also complying with the procedure for termi-
nation of building restrictions. That certainly has not been the practice
and seems inconsistent with the text and policy behind Louisiana Revised
Statutes 48:701.
In its analysis, the court does not discuss whether private building
restrictions are binding on property once it is acquired by a governmental
entity. Louisiana Civil Code article 7 provides that private agreements
cannot "derogate from laws enacted for the protection of the public
interest," and it is certainly arguable that the powers of cities to cease
public use of streets are among the governmental powers protecting the
public's interest that private individuals cannot affect by their private
agreements. It would follow that restrictions cannot legally bind gov-
ernments in such matters. In an analogous situation, it was held that
a city, by its zoning regulations, could not prevent the state from using
39. Lake Terrace Property Owners Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 556 So. 2d 111,
116 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
19901
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its property in the city for housing prisoners.4 The third circuit court
of appeal apparently has taken the view that if the government acquires
property by contract 4' or expropriates property within a subdivision,4 2
the land is not bound by the restriction. In the latter situation, other
subdivision landowners were not entitled to expropriation damages for
the loss of the right to enforce restrictions.4
3
If one takes a narrower textually-based approach, however, the
matter can be decided simply, without having to leap into the broad
public policy issues of private persons derogating from public rights.
This approach would emphasize that privately adopted building restric-
tions are limited, in the words of Louisiana Civil Code article 775, to
regulating. "building standards, specific uses, and improvements." His-
torically, this has meant uses of lots within the subdivision, and not
public areas. Even though the language of SeCtion IX was within the
document perhaps labeled building restrictions, they were not true res-
trictions. They were dedications governed by the more specific Louisiana
Revised Statutes 33:5051, and it is that law that should apply.
The basic theory of building restrictions is that they are real rights
like servitudes; they bind each lot and are in favor of the other lots
in the subdivision. Under this view, rights of passage in favor of the
general public do not qualify as such restrictions. This type of passage,
of course, was what was established in Lake Terrace by dedication of
the former owner of the property. This simpler approach would simply
not apply building restrictions law to public use of roads, streets, and
alleys. In that view, the court would have had to analyze, in the type
of analysis pursued in Coliseum Square, whether the alley was or was
not needed for public use. If not, the passage could have been terminated.
USE OF DRAINAGE CANAL SERVITUDES
The Louisiana Civil Code classifies as public things and grants to
the public the right to use "natural navigable water bodies."" Man-
40. City of New Orleans v. State of Louisiana, 364 So. 2d 1020 (La. 1978).
41. Gremnillion v. Rapides Parish School Board, 134 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1961). Justice Tate wrote, " The state's constitutional duty to provide adequate educational
facilities and its constitutional right as sovereign to acquire land for such public purposes
cannot be restricted or hampered by the provisions of a private contract to which the
state is not a party." Id. at 703. Gremillion was reversed by the supreme court on other
grounds. The issue was whether the proffered title to the property was suggestive of
litigation. 242 La. 967, 140 So. 2d 377 (1962).
42. Hospital Serv. Dist. No. 2 of St. Landry Parish v. Dean, 345 So. 2d 234 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 346 So. 2d 1106 (1977).
43. The result with respect to the lack of compensation was criticized in Yiannopoulos,
Work of the Appellate Courts 1976-1977, 38 La. L. Rev. 341 (1978). See also Hargrave,
Developments in the Law 1983-84,' Louisiana Constitutional Law, 45 La. L. Rev. 397,
415 (1984).
44. La. Civ. Code arts. 450, 452.
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made canals are excluded from the classification and from public use.
The reference to "natural" navigability was added to the code for the
first time in the 1978' revision, but this addition' codified existing juris-
prudence.4 5 In applying these provisions, it should make no difference
if the canal was dug with public funds by a public body. One must
look elsewhere to find some legislation or some dedication by the land-
owner providing for such public use of a man-made navigable stream.
In Brown v. Rougon,4 fishermen sought a right to use a canal that
was arguably navigable in fact, but had been dug by a police jury and
the state through private lands pursuant to a servitude agreement. Under
the agreement, the private landowner granted a "drainage" right of way
and the right to construct "drainage" facilities. The drainage ran from
False River to Bayou Grosse Tete and was accomplished by digging a
canal approximately 15-20' in depth and 65-100' wide.
The court of appeal, first circuit, held that the public had no right
to use the canal under the Louisiana Civil Code provisions discussed
above which limit use to navigable water bodies.
The fishermen had also argued a right to use the canal because the
water itself is owned by the state under Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:1101. That provision, however, has never been the, basis for public
use of streams for transportation. It provides only there shall be no
charge for the use of the state's waters "for municipal, industrial,
agricultural or domestic purposes." In theory, the state owns only the
water, and to use a stream for navigation involves using more than the
water itself; the support of the bed is also involved.4 7 In a more practical
sense, the construction of Section 1101 urged by the plaintiffs would
be inconsistent with the text of the code provisions that clearly indicate
that non-navigable streams are not subject to public use even though
they contain the state's waters. The private landowners had not shown
an intent to dedicate the stream to public use, for the owners had
regularly enlisted the assistance of law enforcement agencies to prohibit
use of the stream. It was also clear that the contract with the state and
police jury provided for drainage uses and not for transportation.
The plaintiffs also urged the seemingly equitable argument that since
public funds were used to dig the canal, it should be available for public
use. However, no provision of law makes such an expenditure the basis
of public use. Indeed, the Louisiana Civil Code itself points out that
public things are subject to public use only in accordance with law and
45. Vermillion Corp. v. Vaughn, 397 So. 2d 490 (La. 1981); National Audubon
Society v. White, 302 So. 2d 660 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), writ denied, 305 So. 2d 542
(1975).
46. 552 So. 2d 1052 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989).




regulations .4  The canal here was not public property; the governing
bodies had a right of servitude, on private property. To make the property
subject to public use simply because public funds were used to dig the
canal, the court indicated, "would allow the taking of private ownership
rights without the consent of the owner and without just compensation
in violation of our State and the United States constitutions. 49
SERVITUDES OF PASSAGE FOR ENCLOSED ESTATES
Pursuing the predial servitude metaphor, it is an enclosed estate that
is entitled to a servitude of passage. It would seem to follow, since the
right is not personal to an individual, that various individuals somehow
representing the estate could be entitled to pursue the claim for the
advantage of the estate. Even though Article 689 states that the "owner"
may claim the passage, the person claiming to be owner cannot be
required to prove good title. A possessor under a just title has been
held to have that right.5 0 It would seem that a true possessor without
title, who is presumed to be the owner, should be able to make the
claim representing the estate, inasmuch as Louisiana Civil Code article
786 provides that a possessor is entitled to demand the fixing of a
boundary with another tract of land. Prof. A. N. Yiannopoulos, citing
the French authorities to the predecessor provisions in the Louisiana
Civil Code, suggests that Article 689 "ought to be interpreted broadly
to include anyone who has a real right on the enclosed estate."" Real
right holders would include usufructuaries, holders of limited personal
servitudes, and owners of timber estates. Mineral lessees would qualify,
but not predial lessees.
Salvex, Inc. v. Lewis52 relied on the foregoing analysis to hold that
a mineral lessee was entitled to a servitude of passage as the "owner"
of an enclosed estate. The court also adhered to its prior decision in
Cobb v. McCart53 which held that a simple lessee of a tract of land
was not entitled to claim such a servitude of passage.
LIMITATIONS ON BUILDING RESTRICTIONS
The Louisiana Civil Code contains few limits on the substantive
content of building and use restrictions that private owners may impose
48. La. Civ. Code art. 452.
49. 552 So. 2d at 1060.
50. Martini v. Cowart, 23 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945) (Plaintiffs introduced
and filed in evidence the title deed whereby they acquired their land and are in possession
thereof as owners under said deed. This is sufficient for them to maintain the present
action.).
51. A. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes § 95, in 4 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1983).
52. 546 So. 2d 1309 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
53. 478 So. 2d 204 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985).
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upon their property. The courts, however, continue an ad hoc process
of developing such limitations on these private land use controls. In
Prien Oaks Homeowners Association v. Mocklin,14 the third circuit
confronted a fence height limitation that was adopted, ostensibly as an
amendment to the restrictions, after the defendants bought their lot and
after they built their high fence. The court held the amendment did not
apply to the defendants. This decision is consistent with the trend
displayed in recent cases which found improper building restrictions that
prohibited government subsidized housing,5 and which construed res-
trictions in a strained manner to allow yard signs protesting a developers
inaction in not improving the subdivision's water supply. 6
An initial issue in Prien Oaks was a restriction on waterfront lots
that specified that no fences be placed within forty feet of the "wa-
terfront line." The boundary of the lot in question was some twenty
feet from the water line, and an initial issue was which line applied,
the waterline or the boundary line. The trial court applied the more
restrictive construction and limited the fence to forty feet from the
boundary; the appellate court reversed, relying on Louisiana Civil Code
article 783, which provides that in cases of doubt, restrictions are to
be construed in favor of free use of property. That provision, of course,
is one procedural device which is often used to support conclusions in
favor of free use of property.
The more difficult substantive issue was whether restrictions that
are not applicable when a lot is purchased can be applied to the lot,
and whether restrictions that are not applicable when a construction is
built can be applied if adopted later. In Prien Oaks, the trial judge
had not actually applied the restriction which limited fences to six feet.
Rather the judge had ordered the fence reduced to eight feet "on the
basis of reasonableness, finding that the fence was out of character and
out of keeping with the spirit and/or general plan or scheme of this
subdivision."1 7 The trial court apparently relied on Oakbrook Civic
Association v. Sonnier,5 s in which the supreme court allowed architectural
standards committee action in denying approval of buildings, but only
if it acts reasonably and in good faith. In this regard, the third circuit
distinguished Oakbrook, finding that reasonableness was not at issue
here, since no restriction required prior approval of a fence by an
architectural committee. It is only when there is a restriction requiring
54. 560 So. 2d 115 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1990).
55. Roy v. Ducote, 399 So. 2d 737 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
56. Cashio v. Sheriak, 481 So. 2d 1013 (La. 1986). See also Hargrave, Developments
in the Law, Property, 48 La. L. Rev. 457, 471 (1987).
57. 560 So. 2d at 117.
58. 481 So. 2d 1008 (La. 1986).
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prior approval of construction that a subdivision architectural committee
can judge on the appropriateness of the construction.
In addition, the third circuit in effect concluded that the restriction
was not applicable, the court stating, "However, a subdivision property
owner may not enforce a building restriction, effective subsequent to
the alleged violation, relying upon the contention that the action is out
of harmony with the general plan."5 9
Perhaps the simplest approach to deciding such an issue would be
to rely on the text of Article 766, which provides that building restrictions
can be established only by an expression of consent by the owner of
an immovable or by "all the owners of the affected immovables." In
the case of an established subdivision, no new limitation could be
imposed without the consent of the owners of the lots at the time of
adoption. This would be the case whether the new limitation is denom-
inated a new restriction called an amendment, as it was in this case.
This approach is consistent with basic real rights theory-that imposing
a real right on property is an alienation that can be made only with
the consent of the landowner at the time of the contract. In Prien Oaks,
all that would be necessary would be to state that the new limitation
on fence height did not apply because of failure to comply with Article
766.
A slight problem arises in the possibly conflicting language of Article
780. Though the title of that article is limited to a reference to "ter-
mination" of restrictions, and though the predecessor provision referred
only to restrictions being "terminated, ' ' 60 the text of the article states:
[Bluilding restrictions may be amended or terminated ... by
agreement of ,owners representing more than one-half of the
land area affected by the restrictions . .. if the restrictions have
been in effect for at least fifteen years, or by agreement of
both owners representing two-thirds of the land area affected
and two-thirds of the owners of the land affected . . if the
restrictions have been in effect for more than ten years. (emphasis
added).
To construe that reference to amendments as empowering the burdening
of all lots in a subdivision with new restrictions upon approval of the
owners of only a simple majority of the land area affected would be
to make a major change in the law on scant authority. There would
59. Prien Oaks Homeowner's Ass'n v. Mocklin, 560 So. 2d 115, 118 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1990).
60. La. R.S. 9:5622, derived from 1938 La. Acts No. 326 and 1960 La. Acts No.
448, was repealed by 1977 La. Acts No. 170, § 8, as part of the Civil Code revision of
the provisions on building restrictions. Comment (a) to Article 780 states the article "does
not change the law."
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seem to be little policy reason to move in that direction, policy being
more generally toward free use of property and limiting private land
use controls. It would be more consistent with that history and policy
to construe Article 780 to refer only to amendments that lessen the
restrictions on property. 3 The court's opinion, though it does not ex-
plicitly state this as the basis for its judgement, is consistent with this
view.
If one were to allow new limitations by the amendment route, one
would face further constitutional issues. Enforcement of private restric-
tions is considered state action that comes within constitutional limi-
tations.62 Louisiana Constitution Article I, Section 4 would then come
into play, with its provision that one's right io use and enjoy private
property is subject to "reasonable statutory restrictions and the reason-
able exercise of the police power." That inquiry would then lead to
one similar to the Oakbrook inquiry-whether a particular restriction
imposed on a landowner without consent is a reasonable one. That
inquiry would then have to balance the extent of the deprivation of
enjoyment with the reasons supporting the government interest in en-
forcing the limitation in favor of the neighbors. That latter inquiry
would no doubt focus further on the reasonableness of the reasons the
neighbors seek to impose the added restriction. The uncertainty and
unpredictability of that approach would suggest that it ought not to be
lightly undertaken. It would suggest that it is preferable to apply the
statutory solution discussed above. If change is to be made, the legislature
would be the more appropriate body to adopt the standards to apply.
Due to the lack of standards, and if the courts are to enter this area,
Prien Oaks suggests it would not normally be reasonable to apply new
regulations retroactively.
ENCROACHING BUILDING SERVITUDES
Louisiana Civil Code article 670, a new provision adopted in 1977,
provides a flexible, equitable remedy to the landowner who constructs
a building partly on the land of another. If the encroacher is (1) in
good faith, and (2a) the other owner does not complain within a rea-
sonable time after he knew or should have known of the encroachment,
or (2b) in any event complains only after construction is subsequently
completed, (3) the court may allow the building to remain. If the building
remains, a servitude in its favor is established and the encroacher must
compensate the other owner for the value of that servitude.
61. "For modification of the plan which makes it more restrictive, however, it arguably
is necessary to obtain the consent of all the owners .... Comment, Some Observations
on Building Restrictions, 41 La. L. Rev. 1201, 1205 (1981).
62. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948); Roy v. Ducote, 399 So.
2d 737 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
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In Pruitt v. Barry,63 the first circuit court of appeal, by a 3-2
decision reversed a trial judge, gave a narrow reading of article 670 and
denied a servitude. The majority focused on the fact that the neighbors,
the Hills, objected within nine days of the start of construction. The
dissenters and the trial judge focused on the fact that the metal building
involved was substantially complete at that time.
The Pruitts owned a small tract of land located in a corner of a
larger shopping center; their tract was surrounded by the shopping
center's large parking lot. Before building, the Pruitts had the lot sur-
veyed and then started building on the surveyed line, even though the
survey showed that the parking lot encroached on their property. They
began work on an aluminum commercial building on September 16. On
September 19, the Hills sent a field crew to survey the shopping center
property and "on or about" September 24, notified the Pruitts and
their civil engineer that the building encroached 12' on shopping center
property. Construction ceased, and the plaintiffs sued their civil engineer.
The Hills intervened, and the matter proceeded to trial on the Article
670 issue. The trial judge found good faith and substantial completion
and granted the servitude. Conflicting expert testimony indicated the
structure was between 48.5% and 70% complete. The judge admitted
that the Hills had complained within a reasonable time, but exercised
his discretion not to force destruction of a building that was 48%
complete "when it only encroaches on a parking lot."'
Discretion
An initial difficulty with Article 670 is that a literal interpretation
suggests that even if all the requirements exist, "the court may allow
the building to remain." The court, apparently, is not required to do
so, presumably for equitable reasons. At the least, it would seem that
this language choice suggests a flexible and equitable approach to these
matters, rather than a strict, rule-oriented approach. Pruitt whittles down
some of that apparent discretion, concluding without much explanation
or reasoning that it can reverse the trial court when it finds "a clear
abuse of discretion. ' 65 This was done by a 3-2 vote of a 5 member
court panel. The earlier decision of the third circuit in Bushnell v.
Artis,6 suggested giving greater ambit to the lower court's discretion.
There, the appeals court upheld the trial judge's unusual grant of a
servitude covering not only the area where the encroaching house was
located, but also three feet beyond (to tend the building and keep noxious
63. 551 So. 2d 726 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 553 So. 2d 465 (1989).
64. Id. at 731.
65. Id.
66. 445 So. 2d 152 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
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weeds from the house) and making that boundary a straight line from
the front to the rear of the lot ("to eventually lessen their differences"). 67
A fence with right angle turns would be a constant reminder of the
neighbors' dispute.
Good Faith
The lower court found the Pruitts were in good faith. Even though
they had been aware of possibilities of uncertain boundary lines, they
hired a professional surveyor and built in accord with his survey. The
court of appeal stated it did not address the issue of good faith, but
hinted in dictum that it disagreed with the lower court, by stating, "The
Pruitts were aware of a potential problem with the boundary between
their property and the Hills' shopping center prior to construction and
failed to make further inquiry." This suggestion fails to give proper
regard to the presumption of good faith established by the Louisiana
Civil Code. 6 That quoted reference to the necessity of making an inquiry
reverts to the older rules of subjective versus objective good faith under
which a person in moral good faith was considered in bad faith if that
person failed to inquire further about ownership issues. That line of
reasoning has been repudiated by the Louisiana Civil Code revision and
its abolition of the distinction between errors of fact and errors of law.
69
More consistent with the objective of the provision was the approach
of the third circuit in Antis v. Miller,70 where the court found in good
faith an encroacher who kept mowing the grass to a line of trees just
as his predecessor had done. He was in good faith as to that being the
boundary even without a survey having been made. It would seem that
inasmuch as a title letter from a reputable attorney would be the epitome
of information that would put one in good faith, the same should be
true as to the survey of a reputable civil engineer.
Complaint Within a Reasonable Time
The majority would appear on solid ground when it stated that the
Hills acted reasonably. Their field crew was sent three days after con-
struction began, and the complaint, upon learning the results of that
survey, was made within nine days of the start of construction. In that
regard, the trial judge agreed and Judge LeBlanc also agreed in dissent.
Complaint Before Substantial Completion
The unique problem in Pruitt results from the fact that the building
being constructed was a type of prefabricated, aluminum structure de-
67. Id. at 155.
68. La. Civ. Code art. 3481
69. Id.
70. 524 So. 2d 71 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 271 (1988).
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signed to be completed quickly. The facts indicated it was between 48
and 70% complete after only nine days of work. Even so, the majority
focused on the equities in favor of the Hills, since they acted reasonably
in making their complaints. Nonetheless, the majority necessarily con-
cluded either (1) that the building was not substantially complete; or
(2) even if it was, and thus all the requirements are met, it was not
required to grant a servitude but "may" do so or not, depending on
other equities. In either approach, the considerations would focus on
the costs of tearing the building down and the other alternative involved.
In favor of the Pruitts was the fact that substantial costs would be
involved and the fact that the encroached area was part of a large
shopping center parking lot, where little damage would be suffered by
the Hills in their use of their property. On the other hand, in this case,
the building parts would not be destroyed and presumably could be
relocated and used again in constructing the building in a proper location.
The majority seems to place more importance, in this kind of balance,
on the rights of ownership and less on the equitable side of the en-
croaching parties. It may well be that the majority was also influenced
by the fact that the Pruitts had an additional monetary claim against
the surveyor because of the mistake; the Pruitts were awarded $330,000
in damages against numerous parties as a result of the erroneous survey. 7'
In any event, Article 670, by virtue of its flexibility and/or vagueness,
fails to provide bright line rules and requires the kind of close weighing
of facts and policy concerns involved in this case. The first circuit seems
to lean on the side of protecting the interest of owners, whereas the
third circuit seems more inclined toward the equities in favor of the
good faith encroachers. The supreme court has yet to speak authori-
tatively in this area, denying writs in Pruitt and in Antis.
71. Pruitt v. Barry, 551 So. 2d 726, 729 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 553 So.
2d 465 (1989).
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